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Abstract
We study how the supply of environmentalism, which is defined by psychic benefits (costs)
associated with the purchase of high-environmental (low-environmental) qualities, affects the way
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1 Introduction
Most debates about the environmental question take the view that consumers’ behavior must change if
the world is to transition to a cleaner society. A more deeply rooted environmental consciousness would
encourage consumers to shift from brown to green products. The change in individuals’ consumption
choices would then spark a major drop in emissions. We refer to the various doctrines competing to
shape the consumer side as environmentalism or green consumerism.
Firms, responding to these new concerns, are paying more attention to the environmental charac-
teristics of their products. More specifically, a product is now viewed as a bundle of attributes that are
hedonic as well as environmental. For example, a car is judged by consumers for its standard perfor-
mance (safety, comfort, power and reliability) and also for its environmental performance (e.g., its CO2
emissions). It is significant that environmentally friendly firms are often producers of goods with high
hedonic attributes. For example, the Group BMW is ranked first in the "Automobiles" category of the
Dow Jones Sustainability Index. In Europe, BMW has reduced its CO2 emissions by around 42 percent
between 1995 and 2019. Since this company aims to reduce emissions by a further 80 percent by 2030,
BMW’s CO2 emissions will then be less than 10 percent of what they were in 2006 (Automotive World,
November 2020). In a totally different industry, Kering–a global luxury group managing the devel-
opment of a series of prestigious houses in fashion, leather goods, jewelry and watches–is among the
top 10 of the most sustainable companies in the world (Corporate Knights’ annual Global 100 ranking,
2020).
Beauty products are currently evaluated not only on their coverage and fragrance but also on their
toxicity and whether they were tested on animals. To illustrate, Estée Lauder Companies–a global
leader in prestige beauty products, selling more than 25 brands in 150 countries–commits to achieving
two goals: sourcing 100 percent renewable electricity, and also producing net zero carbon emissions
(Citizenship & Sustainability Report, 2020). We could easily make this list longer to illustrate that
producers of high-quality goods are striving to supply goods that are also environmentally friendly.
To be sure, this trend to align the hedonic and the environmental attributes is relatively recent. For
many years, these features were not in sync; the more environmentally friendly goods often came at the
expense of high performance. To mention just one example, it took a lot of manual effort to drive the
initial prototypes of hybrid and electric vehicles, which were also noisy and uncomfortable.1 In addition,
there were few charging stations and the cars had limited range, two significant drawbacks.2
1For more information, visit https://www.energy.gov/articles/history-electric-car.
2The above anecdotal evidence is somehow related to the so-called environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) that states
environmental degradation first rises and then falls with increasing income per capita. The empirical evidence is mixed.
For example, the EKC is more likely to hold in sectors where pollution is local rather than global (Dinda, 2004; Stern,
2004). Moreover, its robustness is also country-specific (Churchill et al., 2018). However, it seems hard to draw clear-cut
conclusions. It seems equally clear that the EKC is not purely hypothetical. This points in the same direction as the
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Both the hedonic and the environmental attributes together determine the intrinsic part of a good.
With environmentalism present, the consumer who buys a green product enjoys its intrinsic element
but also enjoys a psychic benefit, a non-pecuniary feeling of being a “good citizen.” By contrast, when
the consumer buys a brown product, she pays a psychic cost, a non-pecuniary feeling of shame or
guilt (Conrad, 2005; Glaeser, 2014). In this case, an extrinsic component, related to the level of
environmentalism in the public sphere, is added to the consumer decision (Kahn, 2007; Carlsson et al.,
2010; Allcott, 2011; Pinto et al., 2014). Whereas the intrinsic component is chosen by firms, the extrinsic
one is conferred on the firms by the public at large. Equally important, different individuals assign their
own ranking of importance to a value system, in this case, environmentalism. Thus the benefits and
costs vary among consumers. In line with the foregoing discussion, we assume that preferences about
hedonic and environmental attributes are aligned, that is, the green product embodies more hedonic
attributes than the brown one. However, we will also briefly discuss the case where preferences are
misaligned.
Since the empirical literature on the consequences of green consumerism is meager, we find it mean-
ingful to start with a theory-based investigation. The classical approach in environmental economics
is to consider a market in which firms produce a vertically differentiated good–with hedonic and en-
vironmental attributes chosen by producers–for consumers who are willing to pay more for the green
variants than for the brown (see the related literature section). However, this modeling strategy fails to
capture the various factors that affect consumer choices in a context where cultural, political and social
values interact with standard preferences. That said, as Stigler and Becker (1977) warn, care is needed
when considering deviations from standard preferences. Otherwise, one runs the risk of providing “mi-
croeconomic foundations” to almost any prediction or recommendation policy. We therefore consider a
minimal deviation from a well-established model by adding individualized psychic costs and benefits to
the preferences of rational consumers.
We consider a two-stage setting in which firms, selling the green and brown variants of a given
product, choose the environmental attribute of their variant first and the price second. The market
outcome is given by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Given the qualities chosen by firms, we first
study the ensuing price subgame. In the quality stage, firms anticipate accurately what the equilibrium
prices will be while consumer choices are now driven by both firms’ quality and price decisions. The
marginal production cost increases with quality because producing a more eco-friendly good without
reducing its performance often requires more expensive inputs and better management practices. We
also assume that improving the environmental quality implies additional overhead expenditures such as
R&D and capital goods.
Our main findings may be summarized as follows. Environmentalism generates the expected positive
evidence discussed in the text.
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effect on the environment only when hedonic and environmental attribute are misaligned. In this case,
environmentalism fosters the entry of the green variant in a market which is otherwise supplied by
the brown variant. In contrast, when attributes are aligned, environmentalism generates unexpected
effects. In particular, at the price stage, when environmentalism is weak, price competition is relatively
tough. The brown firm’s entry to the market can be deterred by the green firm. Indeed, consumers
are not heterogeneous enough for the green firm to charge a price high enough for the brown firm to
enter. As environmentalism grows, however, consumers become more heterogeneous, which provides the
green firm with enough market power to set a high price, enabling the brown firm to sell its product.
Once both firms are active, a loftier environmental ideology eases price competition even further so that
both firms end up charging higher prices. But, because the green costs relatively more than its rival,
more consumers buy brown than green, which raises the global level of pollution. This suggests that
environmentalism consciousness needs not be good per se.
As for the quality subgame, we show the existence and uniqueness (up to a permutation of firms’
names) of an equilibrium. When the level of environmentalism is low, only one firm invests in quality
while the other acts as a potential entrant. As the level of environmentalism rises above some threshold,
consumers become heterogeneous enough for the incumbent to raise its price. This allows the second
firm to enter the market by supplying a product of inferior environmental quality to that provided by
the incumbent. The odd consequence is that the environmental performance of the market outcome
decreases.
These results should not come as a surprise because they point in the same direction as the Jevons
paradox, which generates heated debates in environmental economics (Alcott, 2005). According to this
paradox, energy-saving policies may increase rather than decrease energy consumption. It is customary
in this literature to distinguish between direct and indirect rebound effects. The former are often
obtained under a ceteris paribus assumption, whereas the latter accounts for the endogeneity of several
variables. Although checking the empirical relevance of this paradox is difficult, the best empirical
works suggest the existence of effects consistent with Jevons paradox (Sorell, 2009; Churchill et al.,
2018). In a way, the results summarized above point in the same direction as indirect rebound effects.
Indeed, although environmentalism is always desirable at the prevailing prices, this need not be so when
it is recognized that firms respond to changes in environmental ideology by choosing new prices and
products in an oligopolistic market. Our paper determines under which circumstances environmentalism
generates a “good” or “bad” market outcome.
At the current stage of development, given the growing number of sectors where the hedonic at-
tributes of goods do not come at the expense of the environment, environmentalism cannot be the only
weapon that would drastically improve the current level of pollution. Nevertheless, when combined
with specific policy vehicles, environmentalism can deliver its expected positive effects. It is therefore
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crucial to identify the instruments whose effects are magnified by green consumerism. We then use our
baseline model to study the effects of the two instruments that occupy center stage in policy debates,
i.e., a minimum environmental standard, and the development of green technologies. First, we show
that the health of the environment rises with the minimum standard. In addition, environmentalism
and a minimum environmental standard complement each other in a way that leads to a more eco-
logical consumption pattern. Second, we find that the use of greener technologies leads to healthier
environment through the more eco-friendly qualities and bigger market share for the green variant of
the product.
Our answer to the question posed by the title of the paper is therefore that environmentalism can have
opposite effects. On the one hand, when the hedonic and the environmental attributes are misaligned,
environmentalism enables the green firm to gain a growing market share, which has a positive effect
on the environment. On the other hand, when attributes are aligned, the green firm uses its greater
market power to raise price in a way that leads consumers to buy more brown product at the expense of
the green one. In a nutshell, green consumerism fosters a better environmental outcome when the high
quality product is the brown one, but it generates perverse effects when the high quality product is the
green one.
A last remark is in order. Solving the vertically differentiated oligopoly problem for several products
is notoriously hard. We chose to work with a duopoly as we did not want to sidetrack our analysis
with considerations foreign to our main purpose. Yet it is legitimate to wonder what our main findings
would be in a market with several firms. We show in Appendix A Material that the main findings
hold true when the market involves an arbitrary number of firms supplying products with different
environmentally friendly qualities. Specifically, when the hedonic and environmental attributes are
aligned, a higher level of environmentalism relaxes competition, which allows the entry of firms at the
low end of the environmental quality range.
Related literature. When some consumers are willing to pay more than others to consume less-
polluting goods, the analysis of environmental quality is amenable to settings with vertically differen-
tiated products, such as those developed in industrial economics (Tirole, 1988; Belleflamme and Peitz,
2015). These models have been applied successfully to environmental quality competition. The entry
point of this literature is that environmentally aware consumers perceive products as being vertically
differentiated on the basis of their environmental impact. The main message is clear: when consumers
care about the ecological footprint of their own consumption, firms segment the market by supplying
green and brown variants of the same good, which are sold at high and low prices. This idea has
been developed along several dimensions: (i) the emission of pollutants (Moraga Gonzales and Padron-
Fumero, 2002), (ii) firms’ abatement effort (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Rodriguez-Ibeas et al.,
2003; Bansal, 2008; Karakosta, 2018), and (iii) the degree of corporate social responsibility adopted by
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firms (Garcia-Gallego and Georgantis, 2009; Doni and Ricciuti, 2013; Ambec and De Donder, 2020).
Closer to us, Eriksson (2004) who uses a product differentiation setting to show that green consumerism
cannot replace environmental regulation.
In a different strand of literature, consumers internalize partially the environmental damages gen-
erated by the consumption of polluting goods (Cremer and Thisse, 1999; Bansal and Gangopadhyay,
2003; Amacher et al., 2004; Lombardini 2005). Fuelled by empirical analysis that shows that consumers
attribute a symbolic value to clean goods (Heffner et al., 2007; Sexton and Sexton, 2014), Ben-Elhadj
and Tarola (2014) assume that consumers choose green products not only to satisfy material needs but
also to obtain a socially worthy position along a social ladder. The merit of these contributions is to
open the door to psychological and sociological considerations that are likely to affect the preferences
of environment-friendly consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes the
equilibrium of any price subgame. In Section 4, we solve the quality game. Section 5 focusses on how
the supply of environmentalism affect the environmental surplus and social welfare generated by the
market equilibrium and discusses the properties of the second best social optimum in which a planner
chooses qualities and compare these outcomes to the market solution. In Section 6, we discuss the
combination of environmentalism with various standard policy instruments. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Preferences. We consider a market with a unit mass of heterogeneous consumers. In line with the
literature, we assume that the product is indivisible (e.g., a durable) and that each consumer buys
one unit of this product (perhaps because this product is a necessity good), so that the whole market
is covered. The product has two attributes. The first one determines its hedonic quality. The other
concerns its emission intensity per unit of production and/or consumption, which we call environmental
quality. Firm G supplies the green product while firm B offers the brown one, meaning that the
environmental quality of G is higher than that of B. However, the hedonic quality of G can be higher or
lower than that of B. In this paper, we assume that product G embodies both the higher environmental
and hedonic attributes. Thus, denoting respectively by qG and qB the variants supplied by firms G
and B, we have qG > qB. We will briefly comment on the alternative case where qB > qG because the
hedonic quality of B is much superior to that of G.
Moreover, each product pertains to a reference group to which a consumer relates, or aspires to relate,
herself through the product she consumes. The reference group is formed here by those consumers
who buy the green product. Belonging to this group confers a psychic benefit to its members that
translates into a higher utility. This psychic benefit ψG > 0 is the concrete form taken by the impact
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environmentalism on individual preferences. By contrast, very much like Groucho Marx who did not
want to belong to a club that will accept him as a member, a consumer who buys brown suffers a
negative effect — under the form of shame or guiltiness — that reduces her welfare. This is because
buying a polluting product is perceived as a negative action that excludes her from the reference group.
Consequently, the psychic cost ψB < 0 the consumer bears makes her worse off. Like the psychic benefit,
it is individual-specific. Psychic benefit and psychic cost represent the extrinsic component of the good.
Formally, consumers are endowed with pro-environmental preferences. We follow the literature and
assume that a (θ1, θ2)-consumer is endowed with a linear indirect utility (Neven and Thisse, 1990;
Vandenbosch and Weinberg, 1995: Lauga and Ofek, 2011):




θ1qG + θ2ψG − pG, if she consumes G
θ1qB + θ2ψB − pB, if she consumes B
−∞, otherwise
(1)
where θ1 ≥ 0 refers to the heterogeneity of consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the environmental quality
qi, while θ2 ≥ 0 measures the idiosyncratic evaluation of the psychic benefit (resp., cost) that a consumer
enjoys (resp., bears) when she is (resp., is not) a member of the reference group. This modeling approach
may be viewed as a crude, but natural, way to capture the idea that the pursuit of socially positive
values affects differently the well-being of different groups’ members. Since consumers are free to choose
which product to buy, the group they belong to is the outcome of individual utility maximization. Note
also that (1) implies that a consumer with a high (resp., low) psychic benefit for being green also faces
a high (resp., low) psychic cost when she is brown, which seems reasonable.
Models of vertical differentiation typically assume that consumers are heterogeneous in a single
attribute (Tirole, 1988; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2015; Gabszewicz and Tarola, 2018). Since products
are here characterized by two attributes, it seems natural to consider a setting in which consumers are
heterogeneous along the two characteristics. However, the few attempts made to develop two-dimensional
models of product differentiation show that working with those settings become quickly very cumbersome
from the analytical point of view. Since the focus of this paper is on the role of environmentalism, we
assume with Garella and Lambertini (2014) that consumers are homogeneous in their attitude toward
the hedonic component of products, that is, the distribution of θ1 is atomic with a unit mass point
at θ = 1. As a result, consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay for green than for brown. Using
an a non-atomic distribution is unlikely to affect the nature of our findings since the green product is
dominant in the two attributes. Note also that the first attribute of a product, which is given by its
environmental quality, is a continuous variable.
In (1), the second component is given by a binary variable that refers to the group the consumer
belongs to: ψG = β > 0 and ψB = −β where β measures what we call the environmental ideology. That
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said, we may rewrite preferences (1) as follows:
V (θ) =
{
qG + βθ − pG,
qB − βθ − pB. (2)
Thus, things work as if a θ-consumer were to pay the price pG − βθ for the green product and
pB + βθ for the brown. These prices are consumer-specific but they also vary with the supply of
environmentalism. By contrast, β is common to all. Since a higher supply of environmentalismmakes the
greens better-off and the browns worse-off, the environmental ideology β affects consumers’ willingness-
to-pay, hence firms’ behavior on the market. Clearly, a consumer characterized by a higher θ has a
higher willingness-to-pay for green and a lower one for brown.
Two remarks are in order. First, by assuming linear utilities, (1) and (2) remain in the tradition of
standard models of product differentiation. It might seem more reasonable to consider a setting in which
consumers’ welfare varies with the size of the group she belongs to. It is worth stressing that the findings
obtained in the next sections hold true (up to some new numerical coefficients) if the psychic benefit of a
θ-consumer is given by θnG and her psychic cost by θnB where ni is the mass of consumers who purchase
product i. In this context, consumers, and not only firms, are involved in a game-theoretic framework
in which they must choose which firm to patronize. The elements of the resulting partition may then be
viewed as the equilibrium networks or groups of consumers generated by a pair of qualities and a price
system. Even in this case, our setting differs from the few models of vertical product differentiation with
consumption externalities, such as Brécard (2013), because environmentalism implies that the group a
consumer belongs to affects her welfare in opposite ways. Moreover, we assume that being a member
of a group generates a (dis)satisfaction that is consumer-specific. Therefore, we may safely conclude
that our setting is not another model of product differentiation with network externalities. Additional
evidence can be found in the dissimilarities between several of our results with those obtained in the
literature.
Second, in line with the literature we assume that the parameter θ is uniformly distributed over
the interval [0, 1]. However, our analysis can readily be extended to any interval [a, b] with 0 ≤ a < b
by rescaling the corresponding attribute. Furthermore, in (2) the qualities qG and qB can be weighted
by a coefficient α > 0 that reflects their relative value in consumer preferences. To ease the burden of
notation, we set α = 1. Hence, a lower β also means that the intrinsic qualities per se matter more
to consumers than the environmental ideology. Given these normalizations, a high or a low value of β
should not be interpreted in too a restrictive way.
Demands and costs. Substituting (2) into VG(θ) = VB(θ) and solving for θ yields the consumer θ̄
indifferent between buying G or B at prices pG > 0 and pB > 0:
θ̄ =




How consumers are allocated between green and brown depends on the price gap pG − pB and the
quality gap qG − qB: when attributes are aligned, the larger the former (resp. the latter), the smaller
(resp., the larger) the green product’s market share. When θ̄ > 0, at given prices and qualities, a loftier
environmental ideology leads more consumers to buy green. This is precisely the effect expected by many
activists and NGOs.
In (3), we implicitly assume that the marginal consumer θ̄ belongs to the open interval (0, 1).
However, it should be clear that the right-and-side of (3) may be smaller than 0 or larger than 1.
Consequently, the equilibrium value of θ̄ that must be used to determine firms’ market demands DG =
1− θ̄ and DB = θ̄ are given by the following expression:









Let us now come to firms’ cost. We assume that firms can improve the ecological footprint of their
products, without scarifying the hedonic attribute which is kept fixed. The firms’ choice of a better
environmental quality gives rise to specific expenditures, such as R&D and capital goods, which typically
have the nature of endogenous overhead expenditures. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that
most of the burden of quality improvement falls on fixed costs F (q) (Ronnen, 1991; Motta, 1993).
Nevertheless, marginal costs c(q), which are constant with respect to output, are likely to increase
with quality because producing a better environmental quality without changing the corresponding
performance typically requires more expensive inputs (Lauga and Ofek, 2011).
Since a steady improvement of the environmental quality is likely to require more and more invest-
ment in R&D and capital, the function F is also strictly convex in q. In line with the literature, we
assume that fixed costs are quadratic in q, i.e., F (q) = q2/2. We also assume that the quality marginal
cost is proportional to the chosen quality, i.e., c(q) = cq where c is a positive constant. In what follows,
we assume that both firms have access to the same technology described by the marginal cost cq and the
fixed cost q2/2, which both depend on the quality q. Also, in our setting, developing new technologies
that allow producing greener products at lower costs does not generate additional pollutants because
the possible damages caused by such technologies are taken into account in the environmental qualities
supplied by firms.
The profit function of firm i = G,B is then as follows:
πi(pG, pB; qG, qB) = (pi − cqi)Di(pG, pB; qG, qB)−
q2i
2
, i = G,B.
Competition between firms is modeled as a two-stage game. Let q̄ be the highest environmental
quality that can be produced under the current technology, while the minimal quality is normalized to
0. At the first stage, firms choose the ecological footprint of their products, which determines the overall
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quality of their product along the spectrum of technologically feasible qualities given by the interval
[0, q̄] . At the second stage, firms compete in prices with pG ≥ cqG and pB ≥ cqB. The fixed costs and
are sunk at the price competition stage of the game. The market outcome is given by a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. For this equilibrium to be consistent with the above demand functions, it must be
that qG > qB. As usual, the game is solved by backward induction.
Let us make a pause in order to discuss what makes vertical product differentiation different from
horizontal product differentiation. The distinctive feature of the former is the “finiteness property,”
which states that only a limited number of firms can survive in equilibrium. More specifically, the
market equilibrium involves a maximal number of firms whose value depends on the degree of consumer
heterogeneity even when fixed costs are arbitrarily small. Since q − c(q) stands for the social value
of quality q, this property holds if and only if consumers agree on the ranking of all products when
each quality q is priced at its marginal cost c(q). Otherwise, a firm can always sell its output to the
consumers who rank its product first because these consumers are willing to pay a price that slightly
exceeds the product’s marginal cost (Shaked and Sutton, 1983; Anderson et al., 1992; Gabszewicz and
Tarola, 2018). In our setting, all consumers prefer green to brown when pi = cqi, that is,
qG + βθ − cqG > qB − βθ − cqB
holds for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. The most binding condition arises at θ = 0, which means (1 − c)(qG − qB) > 0.
For this to hold, it must be that c < 1.
3 How does price competition affect the consumption of the
green and brown products?
In order to determine how environmentalism affect firms’ behavior and the level of pollution generated
by the consumption of goods differentiated by their environmental qualities, we need a benchmark case
that describes the market outcome when consumers’ choices are unaffected by social considerations, i.e.,
β = 0.
3.1 Price competition in the absence of environmentalism
By setting β = 0 in (2), we obtain the benchmark case in which consumers care only about their own
choices. We have a standard setting in which two firms selling a vertically differentiated product and
producing at different marginal costs compete in prices. Studying the case where β = 0 is worth doing
because it allows us to determine how the market outcome is affected by environmentalism.
Since consumers are homogeneous when β = 0, firms compete in prices under different marginal
costs. Consequently, they undercut each other until one firm reaches its marginal cost. In the presence
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of a price tie, it is natural to assume that the price tie is broken in favor of the firm with the lower
marginal cost since this firm is able to further lower its price. Since all consumers prefer to buy G when
both products are priced at their marginal costs, firm G can undercut firm B until its price is equal to
p∗G(qG, qB) = qG − (1− c)qB > cqG, (5)
while p∗B(qG, qB) = cqB, and thus the green firm supplies the entire market. The above pair of prices is
a Nash equilibrium of the price subgame.
Thus, in the absence of environmentalism (β = 0), all consumers buy from the green firm, which
sets a price above its marginal cost. This firm sets a price such that consumers are indifferent between
the two products, whereas the other firm prices at marginal cost. This shows the main implication of
using an atomic distribution for quality: there is no equilibrium in which both firms share the market
and earn positive profits. As shown below, this ceases to hold when β is positive.
3.2 Price competition in the presence of environmentalism
When β > 0, a θ-consumer considers the following “quality indices” before making her purchasing
decision:
QG(θ) ≡ qG + βθ > qG QB(θ) ≡ qB − βθ < qB.
Observe that qG and qB are firm-specific, while QG(θ) and QB(θ) are consumer-specific. This dif-
ference is a distinctive feature of our model. In addition, raising β means that QG increases whereas
QB decreases, even when qG and qB do not change. So, everything else, a higher environmental concern
strengthens the market power of the green firm relative to the brown firm by magnifying the quality
difference qG − qB.
Since the profit function πi is concave in pi, applying the first-order condition yields the following




(2cqG + cqB + (qG − qB) + 4β) , p∗B(qG, qB) =
1
3
(cqG + 2cqB − (qG − qB) + 2β) .
(6)
Whereas p∗G(qG, qB) > cqG always holds, p
∗
B(qG, qB) > cqB if and only if β > βL ≡ (1−c)(qG−qB)/2.
Otherwise, firmG charges the limit price and firmB remains out of business, a result that typically arises
in vertical differentiation models when consumer heterogeneity is low (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979;
Wauthy, 1996). Assume now that β satisfies the above condition, so that firmsG andB share the market.
In this case, both prices increase with the intensity of environmental ideology (β ↑) because psychic costs
and benefits rise. Stated differently, environmentalism relaxes competition at the price stage. However,
the green firm’s price grows faster than the brown firm’s with β because more environmental ideology
renders the green product even more attractive as QG −QB becomes wider. Furthermore, p∗G increases
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while p∗B decreases with the quality gap qG−qB. Indeed, when the quality gap widens, the environmental
ideology strengthens the green product’s attractiveness, which incentivizes firm B to lower its price to
restore its market share. This differs from what we observe in standard models of vertical differentiation
where both prices increase with the quality gap.
Furthermore, the price differential is given by
p∗G(qG, qB)− p∗B(qG, qB) =
1
3
((2 + c)(qG − qB) + 2β) > 0. (7)
Hence, a wider quality gap leads to a wider price differential because p∗G increases while p
∗
B decreases
with qG − qB. Plugging p∗G(qG, qB) and p∗B(qG, qB) into (4), we get the following expression for the
marginal consumer at the equilibrium prices:
θ̄(qG, qB) =






Since qG > qB, a higher environmental concern allows the brown firm to capture a bigger market
share because its rival builds on the resulting higher psychic costs and benefits to charge a much higher
price. However, the green firm is always able to retain a market share that exceeds 2/3, which reflects
its quality advantage.
3.3 The impact of environmental ideology on market prices
However, the level of environmental ideology must exceed the cutoff βB to generate this positive effect.
This may explain why the global ecological footprint is unaffected by a mild environmental concern.
When β = 0, we have seen that firm G serves the whole market. When β becomes positive, we still
have θ̄(qG, qB) = 0 until the threshold βG ≡ (1− c)(qG − qB)/2 > 0 is reached where the consumers at
θ = 0 are indifferent between the two products. When β rises above βG, both the psychic benefits of the
greens and the psychic costs of the brown rises. As shown by (8), θ̄(qG, qB) becomes positive. Therefore,
product B is sold to the consumers belonging to [0, θ̄(qG, qB)]. Why do some consumers now choose to
buy the brown product? As β increases, both prices increase but p∗G increases faster than p
∗
B. When
the price gap is wide enough, this induces the low θ-consumers to buy B. In other words, a sufficiently
strong environmental ideology allows the brown product to enter the market. By implication, a more
environment-friendly population ends up with a worse ecological footprint, the reason being that this
social motivation exacerbates the perceived quality difference QG − QB, which in turn leads firm G,
hence firm B, to charge higher prices.3
3Note also that this price escalation tends to reduce consumers’ real income, which may incite them to buy cheap, but
dirty, goods on other markets.
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Furthermore, βG increases with qG−qB. Therefore, a shock that improves the environmental quality
of B makes it easier for this product to enter the market. Clearly, the entry of B raises the global level
of pollution.
The next proposition provides a summary.
Proposition 1. When the degree of environmental ideology is low, the brown firm cannot enter the
market. However, a sufficiently high value of β > βG leads to a higher level of pollution through the
entry of the brown firm. Once this firm is in business, increasing β raises the level of pollution because
fewer consumers buy green.
This counterintuitive result shows that a social attitude that seems beneficial to the environment
may generate perverse effects by raising disproportionately the market power of the green-high-quality
firm. More specifically, this firm takes advantage of the growing psychic benefits associated with the
consumption of the green product to raise its price at a level sufficiently high for the brown firm to enter
the market or for more consumers to buy brown, even though the psychic costs associated with the
consumption of brown also increase. It is noteworthy that Proposition 1 is not an artefact of working
with a duopoly. In the Appendix A, we consider the case of n ≥ 2 firms whose environmental qualities
are given by qκ = κq for κ = 1, ..., n and q > 0. In this more general setting, we show that, as
the environmental ideology spreads, firms enter sequentially from high to low environmental qualities
because the incumbents enjoy more market power when the environmental ideology is loftier.
One remark about the robustness of Proposition 1 is in order.
Remark. Proposition 1 relies on the alignment of the hedonic and environmental attributes in a
way that is worth highlighting. To see what happens when attributes are misaligned, let us assume that
brown has a priori the quality advantage, that is, qB > qG. When β = 0, (2) shows that all consumers buy
variant B. Clearly, the brown firm remains the only provider until the threshold βB ≡ (1−c)(qB−qG)/4
is reached where the consumers at θ = 1 are indifferent between the two products. Once β exceeds βB,
the green product can enter the market from above. In other words, the consumers with the highest
environmental concern shift from brown to green. The marginal consumer is still given by (4) while the
demand system remains the same because consumers characterized by high values of θ buy the green
variant. Hence, at an interior equilibrium, the market prices are still given by (6). It then follows from
(7) that p∗B > p
∗
G if and only if β < β̄ ≡ (2 + c)(qB − qG)/2 with βB < β̄. As a result, as β crosses βB
from below, the brown firm builds on its quality advantage to charge a price higher than the green firm
provided that β < β̄. Less expected, however, when β > β̄ the green firm is able to set a higher price
than its rival because green consumerism reverses, at least partially, the quality advantage of firm B.
Since (8) remains valid, we may conclude as follows: despite its quality disadvantage, environmentalism
allows the green firm to capture a expanding market share. However, the green firm cannot drive brown
out of business because its market share is bounded above by 2/3. This discussion shows that our setting
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is flexible enough to uncover different aspects of environmentalism. In what follows, we will refrain from
studying this case in detail and will focus on the sole case where hedonic and environmental attributes
are aligned (qG > qB) because it tends to fit better what happens on a growing number of markets, but
also because it generates less expected results.
4 The environmental qualities supplied by the market
We may wonder whether these findings of Proposition 1 are caused by the assumption of fixed environ-
mental qualities. In other words, quality competition could lead to a better environmental outcome? To
answer this question, we must determine how firms choose their qualities in a strategic context. We now
turn our attention to the first stage of the game. Since our focus is mainly on the environmental impact
of the goods, we assume that, at this stage, firms invest only in the environmental attribute of their
goods. Since the hedonic attribute is kept fixed, changing the environmental characteristics generates
a direct and proportional change in quality qi in the interval [0, q̄].
4.1 The case of a high supply of environmentalism
Duopoly models of vertical differentiation are characterized by interior equilibria where the two firms
share the market or by corner equilibria where the high-quality firm secures the entire market (Anderson
et al., 1992; Gabszewicz and Tarola, 2018).
4.1.1 Interior equilibrium
A quality equilibrium (q∗G, q
∗




B) < 1, so that two firms enter
the market. Assume that such an quality equilibrium exists. Plugging the prices (6) into firms’ profit
functions yields the payoffs of the first-stage game:
π∗G(qG, qB) =
[















where k ≡ (1− c)2 > 0.
Note here a first difference with standard models of vertical differentiation where a wider quality
gap implies higher profits for both firms. While the green firm’s profits always rise as the quality gap
widens, this holds true for the brown firm if and only if k1/2 (qG − qB) /2 remains smaller than β. The
impact of environmental ideology on profits is similar: the green firm’s profits always increase with β
whereas the brown firm’s first decrease and then decrease. This is because psychic benefits and costs
both rise but also diverge more and more.
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Since the function πi is quadratic in qi, then πi is strictly concave in qi if and only if the coefficient





In this case, the function πi is continuous and strictly concave on the compact interval [0, q̄], which
implies that the quality game has a Nash equilibrium.
The first-order conditions with respect to qualities yield the following best-reply functions:






















When (10) holds, qualities are strategic substitutes, that is, when a firm increases (resp., decreases)
the environmental quality of its product, its rival finds it profit-maximizing to decrease (resp., increase)
its own quality. This concurs with the wide-spread idea that quality differentiation relaxes price com-
petition.
The candidate equilibrium qualities are obtained by solving the system of linear equations (11a)











9β − 2k . (12)
Note that the average quality (q∗G + q
∗
B)/2 = k
1/2/3 is independent of β.
For (12) to be an interior quality equilibrium, q∗G and q
∗
B must satisfy the following conditions: (i)
q̄ > q∗G > q
∗




B) ∈ (0, 1), and (iii) π∗G(q∗G, q∗B) > π∗B(q∗G, q∗B) > 0.
First, it is readily verified that q∗G > q
∗











Clearly, (14) is more stringent than (10) and (13). Unless explicitly mentioned, we assume that this
condition holds. Moreover, we have q∗G < q̄ because q
∗
B > 0.





9β − 2k . (15)
It is readily verified that 0 < θ̄ < 1 always holds under (14).
4Observe that q∗
B
> 0 also holds when both the numerator and denominator of q∗
B
are negative. This case is considered
in Section 6.
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with β, which confirms what we said in the foregoing, namely, environmentalism endows firms with




B) − π∗B(q∗G, q∗B) > 0, each firm would like to be the quality leader at the
equilibrium like in standard models of vertical differentiation.




9β − k > 0.
We will see below that k1/2 is another upper bound on qG. Therefore, we set
q̄ = max
{




Note that q̄ = q∗G (0) if and only if β > k/5.
To sum up, we have shown the following result: if β > k/3, there exists a unique (up to a permutation
of firms’ names) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and both firms share the market.
Note that the average quality (q∗G + q
∗
B)/2 = k
1/2/3 is independent of β.
For (12) to be an interior quality equilibrium, q∗G and q
∗
B must satisfy the following conditions: (i)
q̄ > q∗G > q
∗




B) ∈ (0, 1), and (iii) π∗G(q∗G, q∗B) > π∗B(q∗G, q∗B) > 0.
First, it is readily verified that q∗G > q
∗













> 0 also holds when both the numerator and denominator of q∗
B




What happens to the market outcome when (14) does not hold? Plugging q∗B = 0 in (11a) yields the
corresponding equilibrium quality of the green product when β = k/3:
q∗G (0) =
4βk1/2
9β − k . (21)
while θ̄(q∗G(0), 0) = 0. In this case, the green firm sets the highest price such that the consumers at
θ = 0 are indifferent between buying the green quality q∗G(0) or the brown quality q
∗
B = 0 at price
p∗B = cq
∗
B = 0. In other words, the green firm sets a price pG such that
q∗G (0) + βθ − pG = 0− βθ − 0,
holds for the consumers at θ = 0 who are indifferent between G and B. Therefore, firm G chooses the
limit price p∗G(qG) = q
∗
G (0), which agrees with (5), and its profits are given by
πG(q
∗
G (0) , 0) =
4βk(7β − k)
(9β − k)2 .
Since θ̄(q∗G (0) , 0) increases with β, the green firm accurately anticipates that θ̄ = 0 when β < k/3,
while it will charge its limit price p∗G = qG. As a result, this firm’s profit function is no longer given by
(9), but by the following expression where we have set p∗G = qG:





It is then immediate that (22) is maximized at q∗G = k
1/2 while the corresponding profits are equal to
πG(k
1/2, 0) = k/2 > 0.
It remains to check whether firm G prefers k1/2 or q∗G (0) when q
∗
B = 0. It is readily verified that
πG(k






so that q∗G (0) is not firm G’s best reply against qB = 0 for β < k/3. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of
the quality game is given by (k1/2, 0) for β < k/3. That the limit price pG = q∗G is the green firm’s Nash
strategy when consumers are not very heterogeneous is in accordance with the literature on vertical
differentiation (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Anderson et al., 1992; Gabszewicz and Tarola, 2018).
The limit price is larger than the marginal cost cq∗G because c < 1, but lower than the monopoly price
because G is constrained in its price choice by potential competition with B. The market now has the
structure of a natural monopoly in the sense that it can sustain only one firm.
The expression (23) has another consequence: (k1/2, 0) is a Nash equilibrium over the interval (k/3, β̄)
with β̄ > k/3 (see Appendix B.1). Consequently, there exist two pure strategy equilibria given by the
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interior equilibrium (q∗G, q
∗
B) and the corner equilibrium (k
1/2, 0) over this interval. So, we need a selection
device to pin down one equilibrium.





and {0, q∗B}. The corresponding payoff matrix is as follows:
























This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria given by (k1/2, 0) and (q∗A, q
∗
B). No equilibrium
Pareto-dominates the other because
πG(k












Standard refinements must be ruled out because they do not select among strict Nash equilibria such
as ours. One noticeable exception is the concept of risk-dominance introduced by Harsanyi and Selten
(1988), which extends the concept of Pareto-dominance. The argument goes as follows. The corner
outcome (say) is a risk-dominant equilibrium if
[
πG(k




















· [πB(q∗G, q∗B)− πB (q∗G, 0)]
holds. When the opposite inequality holds, the risk-dominant equilibrium is the interior outcome. In
words, πG(k1/2, 0)− πG (q∗G, 0) is the gain made by firm G when firm G predicts accurately that firm B
will play 0 and best responds to this prediction by playing k1/2, instead of predicting wrongly that firm
B will play q∗B. The same holds mutatis mutandis for firm B. By choosing a risk-dominant equilibrium,
firms G and B maximize the product of their deviation losses.
The following lemma is proven in Appendix B.2.




4.2 The case of a low supply of environmentalism
It remains to discuss the case where β < k/9. When this inequality holds, we know that πG (resp., πB)
is strictly convex in qG (resp., qB). Thus, regardless of the value of qB, πG is maximized at qG = 0 or at
qG = q̄ where (18) implies q̄ = k1/2. The same holds for firm B. In other words, we have a 2 × 2 game
where the two firms share the same strategy set {0, q̄}.
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Observe first that (q̄, q̄) cannot be an equilibrium because both firms make negative profits. Second,
plugging qG = q̄ and qB = 0 in (8) implies that θ̄(q̄, 0) = 0. In this case, firm G chooses the limit price
pG = q̄, so that its profits are given by
πG(q̄, 0) = k
1/2q̄ − 1
2
q̄2 = k/2 > 0.
Last, (0, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium because firm G’s best reply against qB = 0 is k1/2. As a result,
(k1/2, 0) is the only Nash equilibrium of the quality game for β < k/9.
The following proposition summarizes the above findings.
Proposition 2. (i) For 0 < β < k/3, (k1/2, 0) is the only Nash equilibrium. (ii) For k/3 < β < β̄ '
0.410k, (k1/2, 0) is the Nash equilibrium selected by the risk-dominance criterion. (iii) For β > β̄, the
two firms share the market at the qualities (q∗G, q
∗





This proposition confirms the idea that motivates this paper, i.e., environmentalism affects the
market outcome but in ways that are hard to predict. More specifically, the supply of environmentalism
has no impact on the equilibrium outcome and its environmental performance when it does not exceed
the threshold β̄. Consequently, the environmental ideology must be strong enough to have an impact on






9β − 2k < k
1/2.
As a result, in societies where the protection of the environment is not a significant concern (β < β̄),
market competition leads the green firm to invest more in environmental quality because it has less
market power.
5 Environmentalism and the market
The general belief holds that a higher concern about the ecological implications of consumerism fosters
a better environment through more selective consumers’ choices. We saw above that this argument is
too simplistic. First, it disregards the fact that consumers’ choices are also influenced by the prices and
qualities of the goods made available on the market. For example, when the brown product is cheaper
than the green one, the consumers whose willingness-to-pay is low will purchase the brown one. More
importantly, by changing consumers’ incentives, environmentalism leads firms to revise their price and
quality strategies in a way that need not reduce the carbon footprint generated by the consumption of
the goods.
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5.1 How the environmental ideology affects firms’ qualities?
In what follows, we study the effect of a change in β, which captures the population’s environmental
ideology, on the market outcome.
(i) Assume first that β > β̄. Totally differentiating the first-order conditions for the equilibrium






























In words, a hike in the degree of environmental ideology leads the brown firm to produce a better
environmental quality whereas the green firm chooses to raise its emission of pollutants. Hence, a more
environmental-friendly population does not leads both firms to choose better environmental qualities.
On the contrary, the quality gap shrinks symmetrically about the average quality k1/2/3. These findings
are not straightforward because the literature suggests instead that firms have a taste for product
differentiation that often leads them to move far apart (Tirole, 1988). However, we want to stress
that firms’ desire to differentiate their products does not mean that they want to choose maximal
differentiation. In the above, even though the quality gap shrinks, firms G and B keep selling different
qualities.
Consider first the impact of a higher environmental ideology (β ↑) on the equilibrium prices when
qualities are given. As the psychic benefits and costs increase with β, firm G enjoys relatively more
market power than firm B because the perceived quality gap QG−QB widens with β. Furthermore, since
c < 1, (7) implies that a change in the quality gap qG − qB is associated with a less than proportional
change in the price gap. Moreover, (8) shows that more consumers buy green when the quality gap
shrinks (θ̄ ↓). Combining these various effects allows the green firm to save on its investment expendi-
tures by reducing its quality without reducing much its market share. Since the brown firm loses some
market power relative to the green firm, the former strives to regain consumers by improving its own
quality. Eventually, both the quality and price gaps end up being narrower after the rise in the supply
of environmentalism. Hence, more consumers buy brown. It should be clear that the environmental
consequences of these changes in firms’ strategies are not easy to predict.
A standard argument of product differentiation theory would suggest that the impact of β on firms’
profits is negative because products are less differentiated. Let us show that things are more involved
than that.
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is positive if and only if β > β̂ ≡ (
√




B) > k/2 at β̂. When β ∈ (β̄, β̂),
firm G’s profits decrease with β. Indeed, the higher psychic benefits associated with the consumption
of the green variant do not endow firm G with enough market power to compensate this firm for the
narrower quality gap that favors firm B.
In other words, environmentalism is beneficial to both firms when β > β̂, an effect that environmental
activists do not probably suspect. This is so because, when β is sufficiently large, higher psychic benefits
and costs make consumers sufficiently heterogeneous to permit firms to charge higher prices. However, a
higher β may be detrimental to the green firm for intermediate value of β because the wider heterogeneity
of consumers does not compensate this firm for its shrinking market share.
(ii) We now come to the case where 0 < β < β̄. Proposition 2 implies that q∗G = k
1/2 and q∗B = 0.
Therefore, the green quality does not depend on the environmentalism.
Thus, firms operating in a more environmental-friendly society need not choose better environmental
qualities. More importantly, since k1/2 > q∗G > q
∗
B, the market delivers the best ecological outcome when
environmentalism is weak.
5.2 Environmental surplus and social welfare
We now turn our attention to the impact of green consumerism on the environmental surplus and
social welfare generated by the market equilibrium described in Proposition 2. More specifically, does
a greener society incentivize firms to choose qualities and prices such that consumers’ choices lead to
a better environment and/or a higher social welfare? To assess the overall impact of a quality pair
(qG, qB), we use two different criteria, i.e., the environmental surplus and the social welfare.
5.2.1 Environmental surplus
The environmental surplus (ES) measures the environmental impact of the consumption of the green
and brown variants at the market outcome. It is is defined as the sum of the market shares of the two
variants, weighted by the environmental quality of the corresponding product:
ES(qG, qB) ≡ EG(qG, qB) + EB(qG, qB) = [1− θ̄(qG, qB)] · qG + θ̄(qG, qB) · qB.
Recall that we have normalized the best environmental quality to q̄ and the worst to 0. As a result,
the environmental surplus is minimized when all consumers purchase the quality q = 0, whereas ES
reaches its highest value when all consumers buy the quality q̄. The value of ES always increases when
a growing number of consumers buy the green variant. By contrast, the opposite holds when more
consumers purchase the brown variant. This highlights the role of the marginal consumer in evaluating
the environmental surplus generated by a given quality pair (qG, qB). Furthermore, when firms change
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the environmental quality of their products, this has a direct effect on the environmental surplus, but
also an indirect impact through the new value of the marginal consumer θ̄ since this one varies with
qG and qB according to (15). Consequently, the impact of β on ES must account for several distinct
effects.6
Assume a environmentalist society that evaluates the market outcome through the sole criterion ES.
We only discuss the case where both firms share the market because the quality k1/2 in independent of
β for β < β̄. It then follows from (15) that more consumers buy brown when β rises. Since q∗G decreases
with β, EG thus decreases. As for the brown variant, we have seen that its quality rises. Since the
market share of firm B increases, the net impact on EB is positive. In sum, the impact of β on EG and
EB are opposite. Comparing the variations of EG and EB shows that |dEG/dβ| > |dEB/dβ| holds,
which means that ES decreases when the environmental ideology is heightened (see Appendix C.1).
Since the green firm enjoys more significant psychic benefits, it is able to supply a lower quality
sold at a higher price. These two effects incentivize more consumers to shift to brown. In addition,
the brown firm supplies a better quality which should attract even more consumers away from firm G
despite the higher psychic costs. The combination of all these effects allows firm B to raise its price,
but not as much as its rival. The net negative effect on EG dominates the net positive effect on EB,
so that the environmental surplus associated with the market outcome decreases with β.
Disregarding the costs generated by the supply of environmental qualities seems too extreme for
the following two reasons. First, besides consumption, production often generates pollution. Second,
increasing the environmental surplus at a monetary cost that exceeds the opportunity cost of money is
obviously not socially desirable. This is why we find it more reasonable to consider the net environmental
surplus defined as follows:
NES(qG, qB) = ES(qG, qB)− C(qG, qB),
where the total cost







is the social cost of producing the qualities qG and qB when the mass of green consumers is 1− θ̄ while θ̄
is the mass of brown consumers.
Recall that the average quality (q∗G + q
∗
B)/2 is independent of β. When q
∗
G decreases by the amount




B/2 decreases with β. Since
the environmental surplus and the investment costs vary in the same direction, while (1− θ̄)cq∗G and θ̄q∗B
move in opposite directions, the impact of β on NES is a priori ambiguous. Nevertheless, Appendix
C.1 shows that the net environmental surplus decreases with the supply of environmentalism, i.e., the
6Note that maximizing the environmental surplus is equivalent to minimizing the environmental damage ED ≡ q̄−ES,
which is often used in the literature.
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drop in ES dominates the drop in costs.7
Summing up the above results, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume β > β̂. Then, a higher supply of environmentalism makes firms better-off
but worsens the (net) environmental surplus at the market outcome.
The result, which clashes with mainstream pro-environmental claims, tells us something important:
a greener society does not trigger a better ecological footprint because firms adjust their qualities in a
way that may incite more consumers to purchase the brown variant, while the green firms reduces its
environmental quality. This highlights once more the need to study how the market selects prices and
qualities before evaluating the social desirability of environmentalism.
5.2.2 Social welfare
Since all consumers buy a single unit of the differentiated product, there is no deadweight loss. Therefore,
prices have the nature of transfers from consumers to firms and need not be taken into account. The
social welfare must account for the psychic benefits and costs. As indirect utilities are linear, the social
benefit associated with the consumption of the green variant may be obtained by summing the gross


















The social welfare (SW ) is then given by
SW (qG, qB) ≡ SG+ SB − C(qG, qB). (25)
Hence, the social welfare encompasses the (net) environmental surplus.
Observe that SW = NES +Ψ(β) where the net psychic benefits is given by
Ψ(β) ≡ β/2− βθ̄2.
7In the foregoing, we assume that ES and C are directly comparable because consumers know the “true” social value
of the environmental qualities. However, in a population formed by individuals having different attitudes toward the
environment, finding a consensus on the value of environment might be problematic. One way out is consider λES − C
as the environmental surplus where the parameter λ is treated as the “shadow price” of environmental qualities. When
these ones are endowed with a higher weight than costs (λ > 1), λES still decreases with β while the drop in λES still
dominates the drop in C. Hence, λES − C decreases with β even when λ takes on higher values.
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As shown in Appendix C.2, the function Ψ is convex in β and the derivative of Ψ at β = 2k/3 is
positive. Therefore, in response to a higher supply of environmentalism, firms adjust their qualities to
raise the net psychic benefits at an increasing rate. To put if differently, rather than reducing the ecological
footprint, environmentalism incentivizes firms to choose qualities that make consumers psychologically
better-off.
Since NES decreases while Ψ increases with β, the impact of environmentalism on social welfare is
a priori undetermined. We then proceed as follows.
Differentiating (25) twice shows that the social welfare function is convex in β (see Appendix C.3).
Since SW has a positive intercept for all k ∈ [0, 1] while the derivative of SW at k/3 is negative for
all k ∈ [0, 1], the function SW reaches its minimum at β̃ > k/3. In other words, SW decreases over
(k/3, β̃) and increases for β > β̃.
Hence, we have shown the following proposition.
Proposition 4. As the level of environmentalism steadily rises, the social welfare at the market
outcome first decreases and, then, increases.
In other words, environmentalism delivers its expected effects when it reaches a sufficiently high
level. However, the so-obtained welfare gains are not generated by a less polluted environment since the
(net) environmental surplus goes down. Rather, these welfare gains stem from the additional benefits
consumers enjoy by purchasing green. Once more, this result shows that greener consumerism is not the
solution to our environmental problems. Quite unexpectedly, it may even worsen the outgoing situation
because a higher supply of environmentalism affects firms’ behavior in ways that are not necessarily
easy to understand when strategic interactions between firms are ignored.
6 Environmental policies
In a way, the above findings are disappointing. This leads us to consider the following policy instruments:
(i) a minimum environmental standard and (ii) the development of green technologies. We discuss their
efficiency per se. Furthermore, when combined with these instruments, environmentalism might deliver
its expected payoffs. Unless explicitly mentioned, we consider only the case of an interior equilibrium.
6.1 Minimum environmental standard
Assume that β > 6k/9, so that the quality equilibrium is interior and given by (12) at the unregulated
market outcome. The minimum environmental quality standard (MQS) Q must be such that Q > q∗B,
for otherwise the MQS would not bind. Since profit functions are strictly concave, there exists a quality
equilibrium (q∗∗G , q
∗∗
B ) of the game where the strategy space of the brown firm is given by [Q, q̄]. If
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G , qB) over [Q, q̄]. Since πB(q
∗∗
G , qB) is strictly concave over [0, q̄], q
∗∗
B > Q
implies that q∗∗B also maximizes πB(q
∗∗







B ), which contradicts Proposition 2. Therefore, in equilibrium, it is profit-




9β − k . (26)
Hence, (q∗G(Q), Q) is the only candidate Nash equilibrium of the quality game where the strategy
space of the brown firm is given by [Q, q̄]. However, for (q∗G(Q), Q) to be a Nash equilibrium, the following
conditions must be satisfied: (i) q∗G(Q) > Q, (ii) πB(q
∗
G(Q), Q) > 0, and (iii) 0 < θ̄(q
∗
G(Q), Q) < 1.
First, q∗G(Q) > Q holds if and only if Q < 4k
1/2/9 < q̄. In this case, the quality gap q∗G(Q) − Q
shrinks as Q rises. It then follows from (6) that the green firm sets a lower price whereas the brown
firm is able to charge a higher price in the ensuing price subgame.
Since q∗G(Q) decreases with Q and Q > q
∗











6β − 2k + 3Qk1/2
9β − k , (27)
which increases with Q. Indeed, as Q rises, the quality of the green variant decreases, which makes
B more attractive to a wider range of consumers. By contrast, raising Q renders the green variant
relatively more attractive because its price decreases, so that more consumers buy green.
Second, differentiating twice the profit function πB(q∗G(Q), Q) with respect to Q shows that the
equilibrium profits of the brown firm are strictly concave in Q. Applying the first-order condition to
πB indicates that the maximizer Q̄ of πB is positive while the equation πB = 0 has a unique positive
solution Q0. Since πB(0) > 0, the function πB increases over (Q, Q̄) and decreases toward 0 over (Q̄, Q0).
Hence, the MQS Q must be lower than the two upper bounds 4k1/2/9 and Q0. It can be shown that
the binding condition is given by Qmax ≡ 4k1/2/9 < Q0. Substituting 4k1/2/9 in (27) shows that
0 < θ̄(q∗G(Q), Q) < 1.
We now study the impact of the MQS Q on the environmental surplus ES(q∗G(Q), Q). As in Section
4, we consider separately EG and EB. Differentiating EG(q∗G(Q), Q) with respect to Q shows that the





which is larger than Qmax. Inspecting (26) and (27) shows that EG is strictly convex in Q. As a result,
EG decreases on (q∗B, Qmax). Furthermore, since θ̄
∗
(q∗G(Q), Q) increases with Q, EB = Qθ̄
∗
(q∗G(Q), Q)
increases on (q∗B, Qmax).
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27βk1/2Q2 + (2k2 + 54β2 − 48βk)Q+ 48β2k1/2
(9β − k)2
,
which is quadratic and convex in Q. Furthermore, solving the first-order condition yields the unique
minimizer of ES:
Q̄ =
−27β2 + 24kβ − k2
27βk1/2
,
which is positive at β = k/3 and smaller than Qmax. Since
Q̄ > q∗B ⇔ β < 2k/3,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. If k/3 < β < 2k/3, then the environmental surplus first decreases with the MQS
over (q∗B, Q̄), and then increases over (Q̄, Qmax). If β > 2k/3, the environmental surplus increases with
the MQS over (q∗B, Qmax).
Hence, in a duopoly, implementing a MQS is a more effective strategy to reduce the volume of
emissions than environmentalism.
Note that the average quality (Q + q∗G(Q))/2 increases with Q and with β, while the quality gap
shrinks with Q and β.
Furthermore, the cross-derivative of ES is given by
∂2ES
∂Q∂β
= −3k1/281Qβ − 54k
1/2β + 9Qk − 2k3/2
(9β − k)3
> 0.
Indeed, the numerator is negative at β = k/3, which is the minimum value of β, and negative at
Q = 4k1/2/9, which is the maximum value of Q. Since it is increasing in Q and decreasing in β, the
numerator is always negative. That is, the MQS and environmentalism are complements: environmen-
talism reinforces the positive effect of the MQS on the environmental surplus associated with the market
outcome.
6.2 Green technologies
It is widely accepted among policy-makers that the use of more environmental-friendly technologies is
one of the main tools that should permit the development of a green society. Reformulating this idea
in our setting amounts to assuming that firms have access to a technology that allows them to produce
qG and qB at lower costs. We are agnostic about the reasons that explain the emergence of this new
technology. In this section, our aim is instead to investigate the market and environmental effects of
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such a technology. More specifically, we consider a cost function, which we view as a reduced form for
an abatement or replacement technology designed through innovations or governments subsidizes.
So far, we have assumed that production costs are given by cq + q2/2. We start by assuming that





where γ > 0 measures the technological greenness of the production technique: the higher γ, the lower
the cost of designing the environmental quality q. Since we have normalized γ = 1 in the previous
sections, we study how increasing γ above 1 affects the market outcome.
Fixed costs. Assume for the moment that both firms adopt the new technology described by (28).












9β − 2γk , (29)
which are both positive since β > β̄γ. When this inequality does not hold, we have a corner solution
which involves only the green firm.
It is readily verified that the green quality increase with the degree of technological greenness. As







2k2γ2 + 9β (3β − 2kγ)
(9β − 2kγ)2
.
As the numerator of this expression is a quadratic and convex function of β which is positive at β = 0,
the brown quality also increases with γ when β > 0.526γk. Thus, both environmental qualities increase
with technological greenness when the supply of environmentalism is sufficiently high. In this case, the
green quality rises faster than the brown one. This is because the strict convexity of the fixed cost
function implies that a higher technological greenness has a bigger impact on firm G than on firm B.









increases with γ while the quality gap, hence the price differential, widens.





9β − 2γk > 0,
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because β > γk/3. Differentiating this expression with respect to γ shows that the market share of the
green variant grows with γ.





2k2γ2 − 18kβγ + 45β2
(9β − 2kγ)2
.
The derivative of ES with respect to γ is equal to
dESγ
dγ
= (15β − 2kγ) 2k
2γ2 − 12kβγ + 27β2
(9β − 2kγ)3
,
which is positive for all β and γ.













k (3− k) (15β − 2kγ) 2k
2γ2 + 27β2 − 12kβγ
(9β − 2kγ)3
> 0.
For the above findings to be meaningful, it must that the two firms adopt the new technology. But

















(9β − kγ2) (3β − kγ)2
(9β − 2kγ)2
. (30)
Differentiating these expressions with respect to γ shows that firm G’s profits increase with γ. By
contrast, firm B’s profits decrease because β > γk/3. As a result, it is not clear that firm B wants to
adopt the new technology.
Consider a game prior to the quality game, where each firm chooses either to adopt or not to adopt
the γ-technology. Lemma 2, proven in Appendix D, shows that both firms choose the γ-technology.
Lemma 2. In the 2× 2 game where firms chooses between the old and new technologies, adopting
the new technology is a dominant strategy for each firm.
Like in Section 4, when β < β̄γ, the market outcome is given by the corner equilibrium where firm
G’s strategy is given by qG = γk1/2, which increases with γ, while firm B’s strategy is still qB = 0. Here
too, technological greenness leads to a better environmental outcome.
We may thus conclude that β and γ affect the market outcome in opposite ways: whereas green con-






= −36βγk 9β + kγ
(9β − 2kγ)4
< 0.
Hence, environmentalism weakens the positive effects of green technologies.
Marginal quality cost. We now investigate to the impact of a lower marginal quality cost. Since k
decreases with c, a lower marginal quality cost amounts to a higher k.














(3β − 2k) (9β − k)
(9β − 2k)2
.
The sign of dq∗G/dk is given by the sign of the numerator, which is a convex parabola of k. This
parabola is positive at k = 0 and its minimum is reached at k = 15/4β. Plugging this value in the
numerator shows that this one is always positive. Therefore, the green quality increases with k. As for
the brown quality, it is immediate that dq∗B/dk is positive since β > k/9. In other words, the brown
quality also increases with k. Consequently, the average quality rises when the marginal quality cost
decreases.
Differentiating (15) with respect to k shows that more consumers buy the brown quality when k
increases (θ̄ ↑). Nevertheless, it is easy to show that the impact of k on the environmental surplus is
positive. Furthermore, the net environmental surplus also increases with k.
Clearly, when β < β̄, it is immediate that the equilibrium quality k1/2 increases with k.
Summarizing yields the following proposition.
Proposition 6. For all levels of environmental ideology, a greener technology leads to a better
environmental outcome.
Hence, unlike environmentalism, a higher technological greenness always leads the market to provide
better environmental solutions.
7 Concluding remarks
Green consumerism is often presented as one of the main backbones of new environmental policies.
However, very little is known about its impact on firms’ decisions. This paper contributed to reduce
such a lacunae. To this end, we have developed a simple and intuitive model that takes into account the
psychic costs and benefits associated with the consumption of goods that generate different amounts of
emissions. Using this setting has allowed us to show that the environmental ideology can be ineffective in
curbing the damages generated by consumption in a market economy if it is not combined with other and
more traditional policy tools. Thus, our findings suggest the need for policy initiatives that add to those
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aimed at promoting environmentalism. In particular, we find that the positive environmental effects
generated by a minimum environmental standard may be reinforced by the environmental ideology.
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In this Appendix we extend the result of Proposition 1 to the market with n ≥ 2 firms, while fixed
production costs prevent n from becoming arbitrarily large. We assume that firms’ qualities are given
by qκ = κq for κ = 1, ..., n and q > 0. In other words, environmental qualities are ranked by increasing
order (q1 < q2 < ... < qn) and the difference between any two neighboring qualities is the same and
equal to q. Hence, the top environmental quality is qn = nq while the bottom one is q. For simplicity,
we also assume that c = 0. For this setting, we can prove the following result:
Proposition 1a. There exist n− 1 thresholds β1 > ... > βκ > ... > βn−1 such that firm κ is active
if and only if β > βκ for κ = 1, ..., n−1. Furthermore, when β increases, the active firms charge higher
prices.
Proof. A consumer of type θ who buys the κth quality has an indirect utility given by
Vκ(θ) = qκ − βθ(n− κ)− pκ, for κ = 1, ..., n
where βθ(n − κ) stands for the psychological cost the consumer bears for not consuming the best
environmental quality qn, while pκ is the price of quality qκ. In this case, firm κ competes directly with
firm κ − 1 and firm κ + 1, while firm 1 (n) compete with firm 2 (n − 1) only. Hence, the consumer θκ
indifferent between buying qualities qκ+1 or qκ is given by the solution to the equation:
qκ+1 − pκ+1 − βθ(n− (κ+ 1)) = qκ − pκ − βθ(n− κ),
that is,
θκ =
pκ+1 − pκ − q
β
, for κ = 1, ..., n− 1. (A.1)
Assuming that types are uniformly distributed over [0, 1] with a unit density, firm κ’s demand is
given by
Dκ ≡ θκ − θκ−1 =
pκ+1 − 2pκ + pκ−1
β
, for κ = 2, ..., n− 1.
As for firms 1 and n, their demands are, respectively, given by
D1 = θ1 =
p2 − p1 − q
β
, Dn = 1− θn−1 = 1−
pn − pn−1 − q
β
.
In the case of a duopoly (n = 2), θ1 is identical to (3) where G = 2, B = 1 and q = qG − qB, apart
from the denominator of (A.1) where β is replaced by 2β because the difference between the psychic
benefit and the psychic cost is 2β whereas the difference in psychic costs between qκ+1 and qκ is β.
Hence, the duopoly studied in Section 3 is a special case of our n-firm setting. In what follows, we show
that the main properties of the price equilibrium obtained in Proposition 1 hold true for n ≥ 2 firms.
Since qualities are given, we may disregard the fixed production costs in the price game.
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Profit functions are such that
π1 = θ1 = p1
p2 − p1 − q
β
,
πκ = pκ(θκ − θκ−1) = pκ
pκ+1 − 2pκ + pκ−1
β
, κ = 2, ..., n− 1
πn = pn(1− θn−1) = pn
(




where πκ is continuous and quasi-concave in pκ for κ = 1, ..., n.
The 3-firm case. Assume n = 3. If the price equilibrium is interior, the first-order conditions are as
follows:
p2 − 2p1 = q, (A.2)
4p2 − p1 − p3 = 0, (A.3)

























(β − 18q) ,









decreases with β. Hence, the spreading of environmental ideology widens the market share of the bottom
quality and narrows down that of the top quality. In other words, when the three firms operate, raising
β leads to a market outcome that generates a higher level of pollution.




3, the equilibrium is interior if and only if p
∗
1 > 0, that is, β > β1 ≡ 6q, where
β1 is the unique solution to p
∗
1(β) = 0. In this case, it follows from (A.2) that firm 2 charges the limit
price p∗2 = plim = q while firm 3’s best reply implies that p
∗





2) = 0 at these two prices.
Assume now that β crosses from β1 above, so that p
∗
3 also decreases. Below some threshold, p
∗
3
becomes small enough for firm 2 to find it profitable to set a price smaller than q. In this case, the
equilibrium prices of firms 2 and 3, denoted p∗∗2 and p
∗∗
3 , are given by the solution to the system of
first-order conditions for these two firms:
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which both decrease with β. Let βlim = 4q be the solution to the equation p
∗∗
2 (β) = q. Clearly,
βlim ≡ 4q < β1, and thus firms 2 and 3 choose p∗2 = q and p∗3 = q + β/2 for βlim < β < β1.















3 ) = 0 when β = q. In this case, we have p
∗∗
2 = 0 and p
∗∗
3 = plim ≡ q. Set β2 ≡ q < βlim < β1.
Hence, when β crosses β2 from above, firms 1 and 2 are out of business while firm 3 supplies the whole
market at the price p∗∗3 = q.
In sum, we have: assume that β decreases from a value larger than β3. First, firm 1 exits the
market when β = β3 while firm 2 charges the limit price plim = q. Firms 2 and 3 remain in business for
β2 < β < β3. Then, firm 2 exits the market when β = β2 while firm 3 remains in business charges the
limit price plim = q. Finally, firm 1 remains in business for all β ≥ 0. In other words, we have: (i) when
β < q, only the high-quality firm is in business; (ii) when β < q < 6q, both firms 2 and 3 are on the
market; and (iii) when β > 6q, the 3 firms supply the market. To put it differently, a steadily growing
environmental ideology allows firms with a decreasing environmental quality to enter sequentially the
market.
Putting all the above results together, we have shown that an economy characterized by a rising
environmental ideology generates a market outcome whose environmental standard goes down.
The n-firm case. Differentiating πκ with respect to pκ yields the following second-order difference
equations for an interior equilibrium:
p2 − 2p1 = q
4pκ − pκ−1 − pκ+1 = 0, κ = 2, .., n− 1 (A.7)
2pn − pn−1 = q + β
The first and last equations are the same as (A.2) and (A.4) while (A.3) is a straightforward extension
of (A.3).
The characteristic equation associated with (A.7) is
−Abκ+1 + 4Abκ − Abκ−1 = 0,
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After simplification, we have the following quadratic equation:
−b2 + 4b− 1 = 0
whose solutions are given by
b1 = 2 +
√
3 > 1 > b2 = 2−
√
3 > 0.






where A1 and A2 are two unknown constants.
To find A1 and A2, we proceed as follows. Note, first, that the equilibrium condition for firm 1 is
p2 = q + 2p1.
Applying (A.7) to firm 1 yields:
4p1 − p0 − p2 = 0,
where p0 is the price set by a hypothetical firm selling a variant of quality 0. It then follows from the
above two equations that
4p1 − p0 − q − 2p1 = 0
whose solution in p0 is given by
p0 = 2p1 − q.





2 = A1 + A2 = 2p1 − q = 2A1b1 + 2A2b2 − q,
which implies
A2 =
q + A1 (1− 2b1)
2b2 − 1
. (A.9)









2 = q + β.




(q + A1 (1− 2b1)) bn−12
2b2 − 1
− 2A1bn1 − 2
(q + A1 (1− 2b1)) bn2
2b2 − 1
+ q + β = 0








because 2b1 − 1 > 0. By implication of (A.9),
A2 =





the sign of which depends on β.















for κ = 1, ..., n. (A.10)
Note that (A.10) is equal to (A.5) (resp., (A.6)) when n = 3 and κ = 1 (resp., n = 2 and κ = 1, 2).
The equilibrium prices increase with β or q because a higher supply of environmentalism or a wider
quality gap endows firms more market power. Since b1 > b2, we have p∗κ+1 > p
∗
κ for κ = 1, ..., n − 1.
Furthermore, p∗κ increases faster than p
∗








n) increases with β.
As a result, when β rises, more consumers buy the bottom environmental quality while fewer consumers
buy the top quality.
The equilibrium with n firms is interior if p∗1(β) > 0. For this to hold, β must be larger that the

















By contrast, when β < β1, p
∗
1(β) = 0 and firm 1 is out of business.
Assume now that κ − 1 > 0 firms are out of business. Since pκ > pκ−1 > ... > p1, these firms are





































(2b1 − 1)bn−κ−11 b2 ln b1 + (1− 2b2)b1bn−κ−12 ln b2
b1 − b2
> 0
because b1 > b2. Thus, the value of β that solves p∗1(β;n−κ) = 0 decreases as the number of active firms
decreases. Therefore, we may rank the thresholds associated with the exit of firms n− 1, n− 2, ..., 2 as
follows: β1 > β2 ≡ β1(n − 1) > ... > βn−1 ≡ β1(2). Firm n − κ remains active provided that β > βκ.
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When β crosses βκ, firm n − κ is out of business at price p∗n−κ+1 = 0. To put the other way round, as
β steadily increases from 0 firms i = n − 1, n − 2, ..., 1 enter the market sequentially each time that β
crosses βn−i+1 from below.
For the proof to be complete, it remains to show that βκ > 0 for κ = 1, ..., n− 1. First, βκ decreases




(1− 2b1)b−κ+n−11 b2 ln b1 + (2b2 − 1)b1b−κ+n−12 ln b2
b1 − b2
< 0 for κ < n− 1
because b2 < 1. Therefore, βκ takes on its minimum value at κ = 1. Since β1(2) = q > 0, it must be
that βκ = β1(n− κ) is positive.
We may summarize our main results as follows. When β is small enough (β < β1), only the best
environmental quality firm is active. When β becomes larger than β1, then firm 2 enters the market
with a lower environmental quality, which leads to a worse ecological footprint. As β keeps rising above
β2, β3,..., more and more firms that produce lower and lower environmental qualities get into business.
This gradually downgrades the environmental performance of the market outcome because a growing
number of consumers buy the worst environmental qualities. Note also that a wider quality gap (q ↑)
raise the value of the thresholds βκ and thus slows down the entry of lower environmental qualities.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1a, that is, a loftier environmental ideology leads to a worse
ecological footprint through the gradual entry of firms selling more polluting products.
Appendix B
1. (k1/2, 0) is a Nash equilibrium over (k/3, β̄) The argument involves two steps.
Step 1.What is firm G’s best reply against qB = 0 when β > k/3? By construction, k1/2 is the best








Differentiating with respect to qG yields the solution
q̄G =
4k1/2β
9β − k = q
∗
G(0).
Since the second derivative of π∗G(qG, 0) is always negative, π
∗
G(qG, 0) is concave and maximized at q̄G.
Hence, q̄G is the best reply against qB = 0 for 0 < θ̄ < 1 because











is positive for β > k/3. Evaluating π∗G(qG, 0) at q̄G yields
π∗G(q̄G, 0) =
8β2
9β − k > 0.
Since the other candidate best reply is qG = k1/2 with θ̄(k1/2, 0), it remains to compare π∗G(q̄G, 0)





9β − k =
1
2
−16β2 + 9kβ − k2
2(9β − k)
is a concave parabola in β, which is negative at β = 0. Therefore, the numerator −16β2+9kβ− k2 = 0

















k ' 0.410k < 4k
9











9β − k > 0⇔ k/3 < β < β̄.
In other words, when β > β̄, we have k/2 > π∗G(q̄G, 0) over (k/3, β̄), which means that qG = k
1/2 is
firm G’s best reply against qB=0 over (k/3, β̄).
Step 2. What is firm B’s best reply against qG = k1/2 when β > k/3? It follows from (11a) that




9β − k > 0.







9β − k > 0
if and only if β > k/2. Otherwise, qB = 0 is B’s best reply against k1/2. Therefore, qB = 0 is B’s best
reply against k1/2 over (k/9, k/5).
Putting Steps 1 and 2 together implies that (k1/2, 0) is a Nash equilibrium over (k/3, β̄).
2. Proof of Lemma 1. Set b ≡ β/k and assume b > 1/3. It is readily verified that θ̄(k1/2, q∗B) > 0
iff b > 4/9 while θ̄(q∗G, 0) > 0 always holds. Furthermore, we also have θ̄(q
∗
G, 0) < 1 and θ̄(k
1/2, q∗B) < 1
because b > 1/3. Since β̄ < 4k/9, the only relevant case is θ̄(k1/2, q∗B) = 0.
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The corner equilibrium risk-dominates the interior equilibrium if and if:
[
πG(k



















· [πB(q∗G, q∗B)− πB (q∗G, 0)] .




















































The corner equilibrium risk-dominates the interior equilibrium if and if:
[
πG(k




















· [πB(q∗G, q∗B)− πB (q∗G, 0)] .
Using the above payoffs yields:
[
πG(k



































































(3b− 1)2 (9b− 1) (1296b3 − 1305b2 + 408b− 40)
b (9b− 2)4
.
The inequality (B.1) holds if and only if
k
729









which is equivalent to
1
729
(3b− 1)2 (−2592b3 + 2034b2 − 441b+ 22)
b (9b− 2)3
> 0.
The above expression is positive because its numerator
−2592b3 + 2034b2 − 441b+ 22,
is positive over the interval (1/3, β̄). This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Appendix C
In this appendix, we provide the main expressions used to prove the results of Section 5.
1. (Net) Environmental surplus. Consider an interior equilibrium so that β > 6k/9. The value of






45β2 − 37kβ + 8k2
(9β − 4k)2
.















90β2 − 75βk + 16k2
(9β − 4k)2
.






(15β − 4k) k2
(9β − 4k)3
< 0.










which is positive for all β > 0.
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3 (9β − 4k) k2
(9β − 2k)4
> 0.







216β3 − 2k3 − 144kβ2 + 31k2β
(9β − 2k)3
evaluated at β = 0 is positive, Ψ is increasing in β for β > 0.





which also increases with β.


















Evaluating the total social welfare at the market equilibrium yields:
SW (q∗G, q
∗
B) ≡ (1− θ̄)q∗Gk1/2 +
β
2










































































(9β − kγ2) (3β − kγ)2
(9β − 2kγ)2






























9β − k (γ + 1) .
Plugging qγG and q
∗








(6β − k)2 (9β − kγ)








(9β − k) (3β − kγ)2
(9β − k (γ + 1))2
. (D.2)
Firm B prefers to select the new technology (γ > 1) rather than sticking to the old technology





B)− π∗B(qγG, q∗B) =
(9β − kγ) (9β − k (γ + 1))2 − (9β − k) (9β − 2kγ)2
(9β − 2kγ)2 (9β − k (γ + 1))2
> 0. (D.3)
Indeed, the denominator of this expression is always positive and strictly decreasing in γ, while
the numerator is equal to 0 for γ = 1 and increasing in γ for γ > 1. This implies that πγB(qG, qB) −
π∗B(qG, qB) = 0 at γ = 0 and increases in γ. Consequently, (D.3) is positive and increasing for all γ > 1.
In other words, when firm G adopts the new technology, firm B finds it profitable to do the same.









(9β − k) (6β − kγ)2








(3β − k)2 (9β − kγ)
(9β − k (γ + 1))2
. (D.4)
Firm G’s profit difference between adopting and not adopting the new technology when firm B





B)− π∗G(q∗G, qγB) =
(9β − kγ) (9β − k (γ + 1))2 − (9β − k) (9β − 2kγ)2
(9β − 2kγ)2 (9β − k (γ + 1))2
> 0. (D.5)
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B)−π∗G(q∗G, qγB) > 0 for all γ > 1. In other words,
it is not optimal for firm G to stick to the old technology when firm B adopts this technology.
Consider now the 2× 2 game where the two firms possess two strategies, either to adopt (A) or not
to adopt (NA).





























































(3β − k)2 (9β − kγ)




(9β − k) (3β − k)2
(9β − 2k)2
⇔ k (γ − 1) 9β (9β − k (γ + 1)) + k
2 (γ − 1)
(2k − 9β)2 (k − 9β + kγ)2
> 0.














(6β − k)2 (9β − kγ)








k (k − 6β)2 (γ − 1) 9β (9β − k (γ + 1)) + k
2 (γ − 1)
(9β − 2k)2 (9β − k (γ + 1))2
> 0.
It then follows from (D.3), (D.5), (D.6), and (D.7) that A is a dominant strategy for each player.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
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